CVE-2026-60113

This vulnerability exposes the SLE (Space Link Extensions) interface manager in AIT ground station software through seven HTTP routes that require zero authentication. If your systems accept network traffic on these endpoints, any reachable attacker can read spacecraft telemetry frames and inject arbitrary frames into active DSN links — the CIA triad collapses in one exploit chain. The 'before 2.2.2' version boundary is the critical detail to interrogate. Authentication was never missing — it was never designed into a system built for closed, trusted network segments. The CVE frames this as 'missing authentication,' but the more accurate framing is that the threat model assumed physical network security and internal-only deployment. When someone later exposed these same interfaces to accessible network segments, the architectural assumption broke without a corresponding security architecture review. Verify whether your deployment placed these endpoints on isolated network segments or behind VPN/auth proxies — if not, you have an immediate exposure. The patch mechanism matters as much as the patch existence. A robust fix introduces proper session management with per-route authorization. A weak fix adds a single shared secret or API key across all seven routes — which consolidates blast radius rather than reducing it. If your 2.2.2+ deployment uses a shared credential, treat that credential with the same sensitivity as the vulnerability itself: compromise it and you're back to full spacecraft link access. Downstream consumers are your blind spot. Mission planning, navigation, and science payload operations all depend on telemetry integrity. If those downstream systems implicitly trust AIT feeds because 'the ground network is internal,' a single compromise poisons every decision made on that data. Ask whether your downstream systems have independent integrity verification — hash validation, cross-reference checks, or redundancy that would catch injected frame data. Finally, assume active exposure until proven otherwise. DSN ground infrastructure patching isn't instantaneous — there's typically a window between patch availability and full deployment across distributed stations. Attackers monitoring patch releases can probe for unpatched instances during this window. Verify your AIT version now, not later.

Reviewed through automated stages and approved by a human before publication.